In the United States, major technological advances are typically followed closely by policy and laws that seek to regulate those technologies in a way that benefits the population. For example, the development of nuclear energy led to a new government agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The development of the airplane led to the creation of the FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board. Current policy debates rage over the correct legislation for newer technologies such as Internet commerce, violent video games, and "morning-after" abortion pills. In each of these cases policy-makers are faced with new technologies that present unexpected legal and ethical dilemmas. The policies that lawmakers implement reflect the moral priorities of the United States, and affect the ability of the people to have access to those new technologies. By understanding the ethical foundations upon which policy-makers base their decisions, it is possible to predict how the US government will regulate future technological advances. This essay examines the issue of human genetic engineering from three ethical perspectives - Utilitarian, Kantian, and Rossian - and attempts to predict the future course of US policy on the issue. It is here argued that United States legislators will probably use a Rossian justification to impose a complete ban on human genetic engineering, including disease elimination, until the technology can be distributed equitably within the population.

The technologies associated with genetic engineering have developed rapidly in the past thirty years. Gene sequencing has become automated and extremely fast, and laboratory techniques in molecular biology allow for routine in-vitro fertilization and transfer of genetic material. Gene therapy and repair allow for replacement of a single allele within the DNA of an individual. Extensive genetic engineering has been performed with plant material - particularly food crops such as soybeans and corn - and laboratory animals have been the subjects of genetic alterations, as well. The recent cloning of several kinds of animals has highlighted the slim biological margin between humans and other mammals, and it is reasonable to expect a human to be cloned sometime in the near future. Popular literature is rife with the debate over genetic engineering, like the recent French uproar against genetically modified beef in fast-food sandwiches. In general, it is accurate to say that genetic engineering is a topic about which people tend to have strong opinions.

In the near future, the genetic engineering issues of most interest to the moral community will likely involve the pre-birth enhancement of human fetuses. The ability to screen for some kinds of diseases is already available, but with the Human Genome project only months from completion, it is reasonable to expect that the range of detectable diseases will soon be much more extensive. Fertility clinics are currently able to bias the odds of a couple conceiving a male or female child, according to their wishes, but this is mundane compared to the potential of genetic engineering. Selection of specific traits such as hair color, height and even intelligence may become possible. It is this selection of specific traits that is the most interesting consequence of advances in genetic engineering. If a solid analysis of the ethical implications of trait selection can be given, much of that analysis should be applicable to other issues such as cloning and disease screening. It seems to make the most sense to attempt to analyze trait selection because it appears, on first glance, to be the most difficult genetic issue facing the moral community.

The three kinds of ethical analysis that will be used to analyze human genetic engineering in this essay are Utilitarian, Kantian, and Rossian. The Utilitarian method of analysis is attributable to J.S. Mill, and seeks to maximize the utility of an act or rule while minimizing the pain that is caused. Utilitarian principles are the foundation of many US policies, especially those that deal with economics and trade. Utility is very closely tied to efficiency, and maximum efficiency typically coincides with maximum utility. However, a Utilitarian argument can seem incomplete when dealing with issues of justice and personal rights. Kantian analysis is based on the idea of treating people as ends in themselves, and not simply as means. Based on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, this method of ethical argumentation requires that rules (called maxims) be applicable to everyone in the moral community, and that maxims be allowed to become universal laws of nature. If a maxim is unacceptable as a law of nature, then it is ethically wrong to act on that maxim. W.D. Ross’ analysis structure is based on the concept of prima facie duties, a set of general rules that apply to everyone in the moral community. By examing the relevant stringency of the applicable duties and extending the principles to a new situation, the ethically correct actions or rules should become clear.

A historical survey of popular movements reveals that people tend to protest against a law or practice that they believe has violated their rights. It is much rarer to find a group of protesters picketing against some law or practice simply because they feel the law or practice does not maximize utility. As a result, most of the highly charged ethical debates are not concerned with analyzing the sum totals of pleasure and pain by all parties involved, as is the case in a Utilitarian examination. Rather, people are most vocal when they feel some fundamental right that they possess has been ignored or violated. This is just the case with genetically engineered humans, as protesters invoke such phrases as "playing God" to imply that human fetuses should not be altered. However, the real focus of such an argument is difficult to define, and therefore it is often fruitless to attempt an ethical debate with someone who formulates a position of "Humans should not play God." The remainder of this essay will attempt to dissect what is really at stake in this argument, and how the three analysis types might help lawmakers reach a correct moral decision regarding the regulation of human genetic engineering.

Ethical dilemmas arise when natural phenomena that were previously beyond the scope of human contol are suddenly placed within the realm of human influence. In short: if humans can not control it, then there is no ethical dilemma; if humans can control it, then it becomes a subject of ethical debate. For example, a Utilitarian might argue that it would be wrong to let hurricanes hit populated areas of coastline. This might be true, but it certainly sounds like an odd sort of thing to say, since humans can not control the path of a hurricane. When a hurricane decimates North Carolina, for example, nobody feels morally culpable for that action. However, should a weather control device ever be developed, acts like hurricanes would suddenly become huge ethical dilemmas. Similarly, the selection of traits for human children before birth is something that was beyond the realm of human influence before genetic engineering was developed. When a person invokes the "playing God" argument, it reflects the paradigm shift that is taking place with respect to human development: what used to be impossible is now possible. In much the same way, the "playing God" argument was employed in the past to argue against disease eradication, birth control, and surgical techniques. The fact that these practices are much less controversial today reflects the shift in perception that takes place after the adoption of a new technology. Once the realization is made that a previously uncontrollable phenomenon is now directly alterable by human intervention, the "playing God" will almost always be raised. Only by getting past that initial concern can a good analysis be given of whether it is right or wrong for humans to use the new technology.

From the Utilitarian perspective, human genetic engineering would appear to be a good thing, at least on first glance. The elimination of genetic diseases would save a tremendous amount of money and increase the happiness of countless numbers of people. It costs the federal government a lot of money to support the medical care of invalids, and genetic enhancement of fetuses would conceivably eliminate this economic drain. The potential loss of medical jobs that would result from the increased health of the population would presumably be offset by the new industry of fetal genetic engineering. However, the Utilitarian argument is weakened when certain realities of genetic engineering are brought into the discussion. For example, the service would be tremendously expensive (at least in the early years) and therefore would be available only to the very rich. An inequitable distribution of genetic technology would result in a much healthier population among the higher-echelons of US society, and a disease-prone lower class. The resulting division between the rich and poor would seem to be a clear case of injustice, which is unfortunately a concept typically excluded from Utilitarian analysis. It is certainly the case that some life-enhancing practices are only available to the very rich, and yet are perfectly legal, but there is a case to be made for the uniqueness of genetic enhancement as a service. A good example of another special case for equitable distribution of technology is infant immunization shots. These shots are free to those who cannot pay because they are deemed sufficiently important to the health of the population. This argument would presumably force a Utilitarian to concede that only if genetic engineering were available to every parent in the society would it be ethically correct to allow it to happen.

A Kantian analysis of genetic engineering of human fetuses would proably focus on the universalizability of the maxim, "If a parent desires to select the traits of their child, they should be allowed to do so." Whether this maxim is allowable as a universal law of nature is not initially clear at all. First, it must be determined whether the maxim treats people as ends in themselves rather than means. On one view, it could be said that this maxim is the ultimate example of treating persons as ends. If a parent wants what is best for their child, then genetic selection will help the child as a person by giving them a strong start in life and transferring traits that are useful in having a fulfilled life (although what these traits might be is not at all clear). However, it is certainly the case that parents often try to "live though" their children by pushing them to excel in areas that the parent wished that they, themselves, had excelled. The failed baseball player might desire a child with traits that lend themselves to ballplaying. In that case, the parent would be treating the child as a means toward a personal, selfish goal rather than an end in itself. This worry is enhanced by the notion of a parent who, for example, selects musical aptitude traits for a child and subsequently forces the child through countless hours of musical training, against the child’s wishes. The higher expectations that will naturally accompany genetic modified children will undoubtedly be accompanied by more bitter disappointments on the part of the parents. Because of this, a Kantian might argue that it would not be in the best interests of children to allow specific trait selection. However, the selection against disease traits is much less problematic. It is hard to imagine how selection against the trait for Huntington’s disease would result in a maxim that is neither universalizable nor treats people as means rather than ends. In summary, Kantian analysis rejects specific trait selection but allows for disease screening and prevention.

The Rossian ethical perspective is drawn from the set of prima facie duties that W.D. Ross says should apply to all humans. Among these prima facie duties is a duty to oneself for self-improvement through education and the development of talents. At first glance, this duty might seem to support genetic engineering. However, it is unclear as to whether the duty of self-improvement can be carried over and applied to one’s children. Parents might have the duty to give their children the "best start in life" but they are not necessarily allowed to do so if it violates the rights of others. It may be the case that trait selection violates the rights of the child. This seems to be a shaky argument, however, because of its reliance on the rights of an unborn child. If rights can only be attributed to persons (as is thought by many philosophers) then to make decisions based on the rights of potential persons does not seem like correct reasoning, as is discussed in numerous philosophical papers on abortion. There is, however, another avenue that a Rossian analysis might take, and that is to rely on the prima facie duty of justice. If we are morally obligated to seek an equitable distribution of resources, then genetic engineering of children is clearly wrong unless it is available to everyone equally. Whether a parent then chooses to use that service is up to them. In this case, the Utilitarian perspective agrees with the Rossian perspective in finding that both genetic selection of general traits and selection against disease is morally impermissible just in case it is not reasonably available to the population at large.

The final analysis reveals each ethical theory to be opposed to the general concept of genetic enhancement of fetuses. The Kantian prerogative holds that the practice of genetic engineering will promote the treatment of children as means to an end, rather than ends in themselves, while the Utilitarian and Rossian analyses focus on the inequitable distribution of engineering services as fundamental reasons against allowing the practice. The use of genetic engineering for disease screening and selection against genetic disease is also morally impermissible under these analyses unless it is available universally, like immunization. Future thought should be given to the qualitative differences and similarities between selection against diseases and selection for specific traits like height and hair color. While it may be the case that equitable access to disease prevention would be a morally permissible use of genetic engineering, general trait selection may be impermissible. Even more interesting is the possibility that disease elimination might actually be a moral obligation on the part of the parents. Certainly, if the policies and laws regulating genetic engineering are to be the result of carefully considered moral judgements, much thought must be given to these issues in the coming years. While it appears likely that a ban on genetic engineering of fetuses will be imposed if lawmakers use a Utilitarian or Rossian analysis, the conditions under which a ban is required might change with time. Our thinking on these issues must be clear enough to adapt with the changing technology, and we must be able to recognize those times in the future when genetic engineering, or at least disease prevention, will be sufficiently inexpensive and widely available to perhaps become morally permissible.

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